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PROSECUTING DIOCESES AND BISHOPS
JOHN S. BAKER, JR.*
Abstract: Although the sexual abuse scandals in the Catholic Church
and the financial scandals in corporate America have been unfolding
side by side over the last few years, federal prosecutors have been more
hesitant in prosecuting bishops and dioceses than corporate executives
and companies. A recent agreement between the Diocese of Man-
chester and the New Hampshire Attorney General, however, has the
potential to change this. Bishops have contributed to their current
predicament by failing to act more publicly as teachers and judges of
Church doctrine and natural moral law; however, this Article argues
that bishops and their dioceses are not proper targets for possible
criminal indictment for the crimes of individual priests. Regardless of
the very serious criminal and moral wrongs perpetrated by some priests,
and the terrible spiritual, moral, and psychological damage to the
victims, negligence in responding to these crimes does not constitute
criminal conduct by a bishop or diocese.
The sexual abuse scandals hi the Roman Catholic Church (the
"Church") and the financial scandals in corporate America have been
unfolding side by side over the last year and a half. Federal prosecu-
tors were quick to indict both individual corporate executives and
companies. As for the Church, state prosecutors have readily prose-
cuted priests, but have been more hesitant in prosecuting bishops and
dioceses. A December 10, 2002 agreement between the Diocese of
Manchester (New Hampshire) (the "Diocese") and the state's Attor-
ney General, however, has the potential to change the landscape.'
In what amounts to a pre-indictment diversion-from-prosecution
agreement, the Diocese conceded that the state had evidence that
likely would convict the Diocese of child endangerment. 2 In my view,
although there was plenty of evidence against the priests who actually
committed the abuse, the case against the Diocese makes out nothing
more than a civil damage case. An impassioned jury might convict the
* Dale E. Bennett Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. B.A., Uni-
versity of Dallas; J.EI., University of Michigan; Ph.D., University of London.
I See N.H. ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF 'ENE DIOCESE OF MAN-
clitsTER (2003) [hereinafter N.H. krev GEN. REP.]; see also Fox Butterfield, Report Details
Sex Abuse by Priests and Inaction by a Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A16.
2 See N.H. Arr'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 21.
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Diocese, but the legal basis for the criminal case is quite a stretch. Any
conviction would not have been based on actual criminal culpability.
Prosecutors in the Attorney General's office acknowledge using
"novel" theories. 3
 Other dioceses and state prosecutors ought not view
the New Hampshire case as any kind of compelling precedent.
Along with legitimate reporting about sexual misconduct by
priests, there has been irresponsible reporting about religious leaders
in ways that abuse the freedom of the press. 4
 But for the climate of
public opinion created by such sensational reporting, I doubt the
state prosecutors in New Hampshire would have been so bold as to
threaten a criminal prosecution of the Diocese. Public scorn for bish-
ops as a group, especially in the northeastern United States, has been
as virulent as that directed at disgraced corporate executives. When
public opinion weighs heavily against a targeted class of defendants,
prosecutors can bend and stretch the law more easily before grand
juries, judges, and juries. It clearly has been such a time for CEOs in
corporate America and in the Church.
This comparison does not endorse the view that bishops are
CEOs. The Church teaches, of course, that bishops are "the successors
of the Apostles"6
 and that "individual bishops are the visible source and
foundation of unity in their own particular Churches." 6 The "first
task" of bishops is "to preach the Gospel of God to all men." 7 Never-
theless, from the perspective of those outside the Church, viewing
bishops as CEOs is understandable. Bishops "run" large (nonprofit)
corporate entities. They act as administrators, builders of buildings,
and fundraisers. With some notable exceptions, such as the late Car-
dinal John O'Connor of New York, individual bishops rarely challenge
the secular culture by teaching about abortion, euthanasia, and other
moral issues. Much like corporate CEOs, bishops engage the general
community by promoting non-controversial projects such as the
United Way.
In my view, bishops in the United States too often have failed to
exercise their moral authority. In this, they are not alone. Beginning
3
 Telephone Interview with N. William Delker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and
James Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, State of New Hampshire (Mar. 20, 2003).
4
 See generally Rodney K. Smith & Patrick A. Shea, Religion and the Press: Keeping First
Amendment Values in Balance, 2002 UTAH L. ltEv. 177, 181-90.
5
 1983 CODE c.330.
6 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 886 (2d ed. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted).
7 Id. para. 888 (internal quotations omitted).
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with parents, those in authority in America have had, since the 1960s,
a difficult task knowing how to exercise their responsibilities. Never-
theless, bishops have contributed to their current predicament by fail-
ing to act more publicly as teachers and judges of Church doctrine
and natural moral law. That includes their handling of priests accused
of sexual misconduct. By avoiding moral leadership, they should not
have been surprised to be treated merely as corporate leaders. In-
deed, in a conversation with the New Hampshire prosecutors, one of
them compared their pursuit of bishop misconduct to the hypotheti-
cal managers' misconduct at a local Wal-Mart. 8 Regardless of their fail-
ings and whether they are viewed as corporate executives or succes-
sors of the Apostles, however, bishops and their dioceses are not
proper targets for possible criminal indictment for the crimes of indi-
vidual priests.
I. PROSECUTING CRIMES OR "REFORMING" THE CATHOLIC CHURCH?
Targeting bishops and dioceses for criminal indictment is not
only unprecedented, but previously unthinkable and potentially ex-
plosive. As in New Hampshire, a choice to investigate a diocese or
bishop for likely criminal indictment requires obtaining information
from the priests who committed the sexual misconduct; but this
means giving the real criminals some kind of grant of immunity. 9
Prosecutors proceed against bishops and dioceses the same as they do
in prosecuting CEOs and corporations. The decision to let off the
"small fish" assumes a greater guilt with the "bigger fish." As with cases
against business corporations, this "white collar" investigation pro-
ceeds on the basis of vicarious liability. 19 That means, as argued by the
New Hampshire Attorney General, that the diocese (like any corpora-
tion) can be guilty because its agent violated Church (or corporate)
rules." Although there are separate church-state issues of great im-
portance, the prosecution of bishops and dioceses raises some very
basic principles of criminal law.
In April of 2002, after the indictment of Arthur Andersen LLP in
Houston, I published a piece in The Wall Street Journal criticizing the
8 Telephone Interview, supra note 3.
9 See N.H. Arr'Y GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 25 (discussing grant of immunity to Father
Aube).
1° See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10(a) (3d ed. 2000); see, e.g., N.Y. Cent. &
Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-95 (1909) (finding a corpora-
tion criminally liable for employee's act performed in the scope of employment).
11 See N.H. Arr'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 15.
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practice of indicting business entities." The same week, a colleague
published a piece in the Houston Chronicle calling for the indictment
of the Church." Both scandals involve the issue of whether corpora-
tions or other enterprises are proper subjects for indictment. Possible
indictments of a Catholic diocese, however, also have constitutional,
political, and practical problems of an unprecedented nature. Unlike
a business corporation, the Church does not owe its existence to a
state and its incorporation laws. These concerns apparently do not
bother my colleague and others, who see no problem with prosecut-
ing the Church. It is curious, though, that my colleague, as far as I am
aware, is the only self-described ACLU activist to publish an article
calling for anyone's indictment.
Since April of 2002, what might have once seemed unthinkable
came much closer to occurring. The December 10, 2002 agreement
between the Diocese and New Hampshire's Attorney General avoided
an indictment of the Diocese, but it set a terrible precedent of allow-
ing state oversight of diocesan operations." The New Hampshire At-
torney General's 154-page report detailing his allegations of criminal-
ity seemed, in part, designed to trigger prosecutions in other states. A
special grand jury in Suffolk County, New York, did issue a 180-page
report alleging misconduct in the handling of sexual abuse allega-
tions against priests, but did not indict the Diocese of Rockville Cen-
tre." In Massachusetts, Attorney General Tom Reilly indicated that he
would have prosecuted church leaders, including Cardinal Bernard
12 John S. Baker, Jr., Corporations Aren't Criminals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2002, at A18.
13 Stuart P. Green, We Should Consider Prosecuting Catholic Church, Hons. CHRON., Apr.
18, 2002, Viewpoint section.
14
 For example, Bishop Thomas J. O'Brien recently avoided prosecution by, among
other things, committing the Diocese of Phoenix to (a) appoint a Moderator of the Curia
to handle administrative issues "relating to the revision, enforcement and application" of
the Diocese's sexual misconduct policy; (b) create the position of, and appoint, a Youth
Protection Advocate *responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the policy
on sexual misconduct by Diocesan personnel"; and (c) review and modify the Diocese's
sexual misconduct policy after giving the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and the pub-
lic an opportunity to influence the revision. See News Release, Richard M. Romley, Mari-
copa County Attorney, Six Priests Indicted: Bishop, Diocese Sign Agreement Insuring Pro-
tection of Children, hup://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/Press/fullreleases.asp  (June
2, 2003) (containing May 3, 2003 Agreement between State of Arizona, ex. rel. Richard M.
Romley, Maricopa County Attorney, Thomas J. O'Brien, Bishop of the Roman Catholic
Diocese of Phoenix, and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix).
I s
 Robert D. McFadden, L.I. Diocese Deceived Victims of Abuse, a Grand Jury Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at Al. The grand jury report is available from the Suffolk County
District Attorney's Office at http://www.co.suffolk.ny.us/da/home.htm
 (last visited Sept.
11, 2003).
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Law, if there were a criminal statute under which he could indict
them. k6
A. Indicting "the Catholic Church"
To indict "the Catholic Church," as suggested by my colleague, 17
could mean indicting any of several defendants: one or more dio-
ceses, the Catholic people as a "corporate body," the U.S. Bishops'
Conference, or even the Vatican, as well as one or more bishops, in-
cluding the Pope. In terms of criminal law theory (as opposed to pos-
sible constitutional arguments), indicting any of these possible defen-
dants has its precedents in the indictments of commercial
corporations, non-incorporated organizations (for example, Arthur
Andersen), and any group said to be a "criminal enterprise." Once
one rejects the centuries-old common-law rule against indicting cor-
porations, no other criminal-law principle prevents indictment of any
of the above. 19
Acceptance of the principle of vicarious criminal liability elimi-
nates most limits on whom a prosecutor can indict. Indeed, but for
sovereign immunity, the Pope or the Vatican might be indicted on the
same theory that the prosecutor would apply to a diocese or bishop.
Other than sovereign immunity, the limits on a prosecutor's ability to
indict entities are only practical and political considerations. Political
realities would likely prevent a prosecutor from indicting a congrega-
tion (or larger religious body that is not a corporation) as a criminal
enterprise.
The common law prevented the indictment of corporations be-
cause they lack a soul and thus are incapable of forming a mens rea. 19
The principle is apparently derived from the pronouncement of Pope
Innocent IV that corporations could not be excommunicated because
they lack a soul." The United States Supreme Court abandoned the
common-law rule in 1909 in New York Central 4? Hudson River Railroad
Co. v. United States. 21 The Court did not offer much of a rationale.
16 See Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes, Abuse Scandal Far Deeper Than Disclosed,
Report Says Victims of Clergy Mety Exceed 1,000, Reilly Estimates, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 2003,
at Al,
12 See Green, supra note 13.
Is See LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 3.10(a).
1° See John C. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Micu. L. REV. 386, 386-87 (1981).
20
 Id. at 386 n.2.
2 ' 212 U.S. at 492-93.
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Others, however, have made attempts to justify the indictment of cor-
porations. There are two basic justifications. One takes the anthro-
pomorphic approach of analogizing a corporation to a human per-
son. Thus, the board of directors is compared to the intellect, and the
management is compared to the will of a person. The approach as-
sumes that it is important, even if fictionally, to impute a mens rea.
This view coincides with the provisions of the Model Penal Code,
which require that the actions be imputable to the board of directors
or senior management.22 The other approach, recognizing that cor-
porations are incapable of mens rea, candidly bases liability on tort
principles of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. The
justification is simply a supposed necessity. This view reflects federal
cases, which do not require the endorsement by the board of direc-
tors or senior management." It is only necessary that an employee has
acted for the benefit of the corporation. However justified, corporate
criminal liability and the vicarious liability it imposes "is a substantial
departure from the ordinary rule that a principal is not answerable
criminally for the acts of his agent without the principal's authoriza-
tion, consent or knowledge, and thus corporate criminal liability con-
tinues to be a matter of vigorous debate." 24
Whether a defendant's mens rea is imputed or actual, the prose-
cutor must offer some proof as to the mental element required by the
statute. In the case against the Diocese, the theory differs from the
usual corporate indictment. When an employee of a business violates
a particular criminal statute, an indictment against the corporation
generally charges the same crime—on the theory that what the em-
ployee did benefited the corporation. Of course, the New Hampshire
prosecutors do not claim that the sexual misconduct of priests
benefited the Church—whether considered as diocese, bishop, con-
ference of bishops, Vatican, or Pope. Indeed, the victims were part of
the Church as a corporate body.
The alleged vicarious criminal liability of the Diocese is not based
directly on the priests' conduct, but on the reaction to that conduct
by past ordinaries and other Diocesan officials. 25 The New Hampshire
22 See Mom, PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1962),
23 Sec LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 3.10(c) & n.62.
24
 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10(b),
at 364 (footnotes omitted).
23 Under Canon Law, an "ordinary" is any church leader (such as a diocesan bishop)
who has executive power over a particular church or equivalent community. See 1983 CODE
c.134, § I.
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Attorney General's Report on the Investigation of the Diocese of
Manchester alleges that the Diocese committed several kinds of
critnes: 26 1) contributing to the delinquency of a minor:27 2) failure to
make mandatory reports of child abuse; 28 3) compounding a crime:29
4) perjury:" 5) false swearing:" 6) unsworn falsification: 32 and 7)
child endangerment.33 The report acknowledges, as it must, that the
statute of limitations has run on potential charges under the first
three crimes and may have run on the next. three crimes." Neverthe-
less, the report claims the ability to use evidence of these crimes to
prove several elements of the charges under the one crime on which
they rely: child endangerment. As discussed below, the theory of the
prosecutors on child endangerment. effectively imposes a negligence
standard." Again, however, these child endangerment charges would
appear to be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Neverthe-
less, by using a theory that the Diocese through fraud violated a
"fiduciary duty" the Diocese supposedly owes its parishioners, the
prosecutors contend the statute of limitations tolled until recently. 36
In response to my wonderment about such a theory, the prosecutors
conceded it was "novel."37
However well-intentioned and plausible their legal theories, the
New Hampshire prosecutors are ignoring the fundamental moral ba-
sis of criminal law. In saying that, I am not questioning their good
faith. Having spoken with the two principal prosecutors, I am im-
pressed by their competence, their sincerity, and their desire to pro-
tect the public. Nevertheless, even if a previous bishop was not merely
negligent but criminally reckless, what their self-described "novel the-
ory" does is impose moral stigma on a clearly innocent bishop and the
Church itself. Priests, who are "agents" of the Church, have violated its
basic teachings and damaged the Church, but the Church, not the
26 N.H. Arr'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 3-14.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:32 (Supp. 1972) (repealed 1979). The Attorney General
investigated whether the diocese had engaged in conduct that would have violated this
statute before its repeal. See N.H. Arr'v GEN. REP., supra note I, at 10.
25 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1996).
" Id. § 642:5.
30 Id. § 641:1, 1(a).
31 Id. § 641:2, I.
REV. STAT. Arm. § 641:3, II(a).
33 Id. § 639:3, I.
34 N.H. Arr'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 3-14.
33 See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
36 N.H. Arr'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 8-9.
37 Telephone Interview, supra note 3.
1068	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:1061
actual offenders, is the target of indictment. Whatever justification all
of this might arguably have in terms of a business corporation with
multiple shareholders and directors, the Diocese is, like many dio-
ceses, a "corporation sole."38
 To indict the diocese is to indict the cur-
rent bishop who, in the case of Manchester and many dioceses, was
not even connected to the diocese at the time of the relevant events. '
Generally, state prosecutors do not indict many corporations. In-
dicting corporations is more common at the federal level. States are
often too occupied with street crime. The most notable state investiga-
tion during the current period of corporate scandals has been New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's investigation of Wall Street bro-
kerage firms. Although he could have done so, Mr. Spitzer had the
good (political) sense not to indict because he recognized the danger
of terminating those businesses.39 His aggressive civil actions neverthe-
less forced an agreement with brokerage houses to submit to a certain
amount of oversight. This gave Mr. Spitzer a national profile and ex-
panded his jurisdiction. The agreement with the Diocese elevates the
political profile of the New Hampshire Attorney General, at least
within that state. It expands the jurisdiction of his office by granting
oversight of the Diocese for a period of years, as Mr. Spitzer has over
brokerage houses.
Although the Bush administration has aggressively pursued busi-
ness corporations, it has shown no indication of considering indict-
ment of dioceses (which would hardly be in keeping with its promo-
tion of faith-based initiatives). Indeed, it would be quite a stretch for a
federal prosecutor to attempt an indictment as the law presently ex-
ists. Current federal criminal law related to sexual abuse is, as it
should be, quite limited. If one were to file a federal criminal indict-
ment, it probably would be based on every federal prosecutor's favor-
ite tool, the ever-elastic mail or wire fraud statutes, as a predicate for a
charge under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). As discussed by Professor Robert Blakey, a significant
number of civil RICO cases have been filed against various dioceses. 4°
In theory, if those cases could establish a violation of the federal fraud
38
 A corporation sole is 'a series of successive persons holding an office; a continuous
legal personality that is attributed to successive holders of certain monarchical or ecclesias-
tical positions, such as kings, bishops, rectors, vicars, and the like." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 342 (7th ed. 1999).
39 John Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER,
Apr. 7, 2003, at 54.
0
 Robert Blakey, Address at the Boston College Law School Symposium (Apr. 4, 2003).
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statutes, for purposes of a civil action, the same evidence might prove
a criminal indictment. That, however, is not intended to endorse at-
tempts to abuse the federal fraud and RICO statutes.
Whether it is a federal or state indictment, indicting any corpora-
tion for a criminal offense violates the basic requirement of personal
guilt, which is based on an actual, not a fictional or imputed, mens
rea. The essence of crime, that which distinguishes it from torts, in-
volves a public, rather than a merely private, wrong. The punishment
for public wrongs—the stigma of being branded a criminal—is prop-
erly applied only to individuals. As a matter both of moral principle
and political liberty, convicting abstract entities confuses the principle
of personal responsibility.
B. Crimes and Sins of Omission
Prosecutors sometimes prefer indicting corporations because
they cannot prove that a particular individual committed a crime. As
discussed above, the situation is different in the attempt to indict a
diocese or bishop in connection with priest sexual abuse allegations.
Essentially, prosecutors are pursuing an omission or failure-to-act the-
ory. Thus, in New Hampshire, the charge is that "the Diocese took
inadequate or no action to protect these children within the parish."'"
Moreover, as in New Hampshire where the alleged criminal omissions
occurred, bishops who headed the Diocese at the time of the inci-
dents—mostly in the 1970s and 1980s—no longer serve as the local
ordinary. 42 In New Hampshire and many dioceses, the prosecutor
cannot plausibly prosecute the current local ordinaries. It becomes
attractive, therefore, to indict the Diocese as a corporation instead.
One may be guilty through omission. This is a familiar concept in
moral matters. Thus, the Catholic Catechism refers to sins of omis-
sion." In American criminal law, however, guilt on the basis of omis-
sion or failure to act has been the exception. Here, American criminal
law has—rightly—been more restrictive than the moral law. That is to
say, certain omissions that are clearly immoral nevertheless may not
be criminal.
Some countries do criminally punish such omissions under what
are called "Good Samaritan" laws. In the United States, however, we
41 NJ-LAI-1°v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 1.
42 See Laurie Goodstein & Anthony Zirilli, Decades of Damage: Trail of Pain in Church Cri-
sis Leads to Nearly Every Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1.
43 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 6, para. 1853.
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have generally only punished omissions in connection with a narrow
category of duties, namely the omissions 1) by parents to children; 2)
by spouses to each other; 3) by parties obligated by contract; and 4)
by someone who voluntarily assumes a responsibility to another."
Statutes can and have added to those duties. Of course, bishops have
obligations to all those within their dioceses. But what duties count
for purposes of criminal law? What constitutes failure or omission
with respect to that duty? And when is the failure criminally culpable?
In order for a failure to act to constitute a culpable omission, one
must not only have a duty cognizable by the criminal law, but one
must also know of the duty and the facts that trigger the obligation in
the particular situation. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
1957 in Lambert v. California, the Due Process Clause limits how states
can impose criminal liability on the basis of ()Mission." Assuming,
however, that the criminal law imposes some obligation on bishops
and that an omission in the sexual abuse cases might be cognizable by
the criminal law, the following issues remain: 1) whether the particu-
lar facts gave rise to a legal duty to act; and 2) whether a bishop had
actual knowledge of sufficient facts to know that his failure to act was
criminally culpable."
In addition to the particular mess rea required by a criminal
statute, cases of omission involve a general principle of causation. 47
Without a clear understanding of causation in criminal law, many
prosecutors have the tendency to characterize facts that involve only
tort negligence as involving a criminally culpable omission. As a gen-
eral principle, causation is most often encountered in the context of
criminal homicide. It arises in the routine homicide case because
someone, such as the coroner, must establish the cause-in-fact of
death. In some complicated cases, causation becomes a legal issue in
which more than one factual (or "but for") cause exists, from which is
determined the legal cause of death. Causation, however, underlies
other doctrines, even though the term is rarely mentioned in that
context. Importantly, the principle of causation is the foundation for
the doctrine of complicity, also referred to as "aiding and abetting,"
or the doctrine of principals." An accomplice or a principal can be
tried for a crime even though he does not commit the necessary
44 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F,2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
45 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
4° See LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 3.3(b).
47
 SeejEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 195-97 (2d ed. 1960).
18 Id. at 270-79.
2003] 	 Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops 	 1071
criminal act. To be criminally liable, the accomplice must have had a
mens rea and must have done some act—although not the actual
criminal act—which makes him a "cause" of the act. One can be a mo-
tivating cause of the crime by counseling, encouraging, or in some
way assisting the criminal act. 49 That aid has to be within the knowl-
edge and the willed actions of the alleged accomplice. Thus, if one in
ignorance assists a criminal act, then one is not an accomplice. One
must possess a mens rea (i.e., knowing, intentional, purposeful, or
reckless mental attitude) connected to the criminal act—a state of
mind qualitatively different from ordinary negligence.
American criminal law has long been conflicted about criminal
negligence. 5° The difficulty has been to distinguish criminal negli-
gence from ordinary tort negligence. Most attempts by courts and leg-
islatures to express the difference have proved unsatisfactory. There
was general agreement that "something more" was required for one to
be branded a criminal, but just what was unclear. The general use of
the term "gross negligence" appeared to be quantitative, rather than
qualitative. As Professor Jerome Hall wrote, for criminal negligence to
constitute a mens rea, the defendant must have engaged in a con-
scious choice. 51 Rather than negligence, the basis of criminality in
"criminal negligence" is, or should be, recklessness. That is to say, for
a mens rea to exist, a defendant must have been aware of the prohib-
ited conduct and have consciously disregarded a high degree of risk
that the action he or she was undertaking would cause the prohibited
conduct. Ultimately, the Model Penal Code articulated this principle
of recklessness and labeled it as such. Unfort unately, the Model Penal
Code also carved out a category of "criminal negligence," which is less
serious than recklessness and, arguably, does not involve actual moral
culpability. Still, even the Model Penal Code's "criminal negligence"
supposedly involves something more than ordinary tort negligence,
although it is not obvious how this is so. 52
The Attorney General's approach to the New Hampshire child
endangerment statute endangers the innocent by effectively eroding
protections that would prevent a conviction on what amounts to no
more than negligence. The New Hampshire child endangerment
49 See id.
5° Sec id. at 158-63, 165.
" See id. at 114-15.
52 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. n.31 (1985) ("It will of
course be noticed that the requirements established are considerably more rigorous than
simple negligence as usually treated in the law of torts.").
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statute has two parts to its mens rea: requiring "knowingly" endanger-
ing the welfare of a child under age eighteen and "purposely" violat-
ing a duty of care owed to the child. 53
 To prove a "knowing" omission,
the Attorney General must identify the duty. For that, he quotes from
a Pennsylvania case, which states that child endangerment "'involves
the endangering of the physical or moral welfare of a child by an act
or omission in violation of [a] legal duty even though such legal duty does
not itself carry a criminal sanction."'" Imposing a duty in criminal law
that was not clearly known raises precisely the kind of due process
problem addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lambert.55
The Attorney General's report must acknowledge that the New
Hampshire child endangerment statute has a more rigorous mens rea
than similar statutes from other states. 56
 Nevertheless, the Attorney
General's expansive interpretation would undo that statutory protec-
tion. That interpretation would allow for conviction based on what
amounts merely to negligence, i.e., failing to take effective steps. The
Attorney General's litigation plan involves further diluting the mens
rea by using evidence of misdemeanors, i.e., the failure to report child
abuse, which themselves are time barred and, therefore, cannot be
charged. The Attorney General claims these might be admissible to
establish parts of the mental element required for child endanger-
men t. 57
The Attorney General then goes on to ignore the substance of
the term "purposely." By adding "purposely" to the statute, the legisla-
ture deliberately made it more difficult to prove child endangerment.
The term "purposely" requires that the actor's "conscious object is to
cause the result."58
 In the only New Hampshire case interpreting the
child endangerment statute, that state's supreme court said that a
husband could be guilty of "purposeful disregard" of his duty of care
to his child when he watched his wife severely beat their child on a
regular basis without doing anything.59
 The Attorney General's report
concludes that "[t]his case, thus, recognizes that a person can be
"N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (1996).
54 N.H. A•r'y GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515
A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)) (second emphasis added).
55
 355 U.S. at 228.
"Sec N.H. Arr'Y GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 7.
57 Id. at 13.
5a
 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. g 626:2, I1(a).
59 See State v. Portigue, 481 A.2d 534, 539, 544 (N.H. 1984); see also N.H. ATer GEN.
REP., supra note 1, at 7-8.
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guilty of violating RSA 639:3, I, for failing to take effective steps to
protect a child from the dangerous acts of another."°
The Attorney General analogizes the case of the parent who is
actually present at a beating of his or her child by the other parent
with the omissions of past bishops. 61 In the situation of the parent, his
or her knowledge of both the general duty and its application at the
moment could not be clearer. The required knowledge is properly
inferable due to the immediacy of the danger to the child while in the
parent's presence. Such parental knowledge provides the evidence to
support a claim that the parent's "conscious object is to cause" the
proscribed harm by failing to do anything. 62 Indeed, almost the only
reasonable inference from the evidence is that the "do-nothing par-
ent" chose to permit the physical abuse of the child. For the two situa-
tions to be truly analogous, the bishop or other diocesan official
would have had to he present while a priest was sexually abusing a
minor without the bishop or diocesan official making an attempt to
in ter yen e .63
It is the contention of the prosecutors that they can show the
Diocese "purposely" violated its duty of care by showing "that the Dio-
cese consciously choose [sic] to protect itself and its priests from
scandal, lawsuits, and criminal charges instead of protecting the mi-
nor parishioners?" Even if a motive was to protect priests and the
Church, such a decision does not prove the purpose required in the
statute. The term "purposely" is defined by a New Hampshire statute,
following the Model Penal Code, as follows: "A person acts purposely
with respect to a material element of an offense when his conscious
object is to cause the result or engage in the conduct that comprises
the element."65 That means that the bishop would have as "his con-
scious object" to cause endangerment of children.
The Attorney General's approach to mens rea virtually empties it
of meaning. His very broad view of mens rea would be unjust enough
as applied to the omissions of a particular bishop or to the Diocese,
based on the bishop's acts. But the Attorney General imputes criminal
60 N.H. Any GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 8.
61 See id.
82 See N.H. REV. STA•. ANN. § 626:2, 11(a).
63 See Portigue, 481 A.2d at 544.
64 N.H. A•T'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 8.
65 N.H. REV. STA•. ANN. § 626:2, 11(a); see also N.H. A•T'y GEN. Itrx., supn note 1, at 7-
8; Monet. PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a) (1962).
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liability on the basis of the "collective knowledge" of the Diocese.°
The Attorney General's report focuses on the "institutional failings of
the Diocese and not the criminal responsibility of particular Diocesan
officials."67 As with white collar crime and hate crime generally, the
Attorney General has focused not on the offense, but the offender. 68
The report does so, I suggest, because the Attorney General is unable
to prove any personal criminal act beyond those of the individual
priests who committed the abuse.
In the case of bishops, as in other criminal negligence cases,
people seem to be confusing tort and criminal law. No one—bishop
or otherwise—should be branded with a criminal conviction unless
the person's conduct is at least reckless with respect to a criminal act,
and the statute permits conviction on that basis. Ordinary tort negli-
gence, even under the Model Penal Code, is not sufficient.° Whether
or not one had a guilty mind, however, is very fact specific. In hind-
sight, it may appear very clear that the bishops "should have known"
better. I certainly believe they should have known in some cases. In
assessing whether one "should have known," there is a difference be-
tween whether a bishop was aware of the particular criminal risk and
consciously chose to disregard it, or whether the bishop simply did
not know enough to be fully aware and chose consciously to disregard
it. The fact that with 20/20 hindsight we can say that a bishop should
have known or taken more action does not constitute recklessness.
People are generally unaware that there was a "radical change in
attitudes toward child sexual abuse that had occurred during the late
1970s and early 1980s."" As explained by a leading expert in the field,
Professor Philip Jenkins, until that time, "professional and scholarly
opinions generally underplayed the significance and harmfulness of
`sex abuse.' wn As he says, "[t} his perspective makes it easier to under-
stand why church authorities were so prepared to exercise tolerance
toward priests found to be sexually involved with minors: the behavior
was not then thought to be harmful or 'abusive.'" During this pe-
68 Sce N.H.A-I-Vv. GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 18-19.
67 Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted).
68 See NIctiouts N. KITTRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND COR-
RECTIONS 634-35 (2002).
69 The Model Penal Code includes the mental state of negligence as distinct from reck-
lessness, but distinguishes criminal negligence from ordinary tort negligence. See MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. n.31 (1985).
70 PHILIP JENKINs, PEDoPIIILF,s AND PRIESTS 16 (1996).
71 See id.
72 Id.
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riod, bishops were regularly consulting psychologists about the poten-
tial for rehabilitation of priests who had engaged in sexual miscon-
duct." These "experts" advised bishops that priests who had engaged
in sexual misconduct could be rehabilitated and safely moved to other
places. 74 Since then, that advice has proven to be very misguided.
Maybe these "experts" should be sued for malpractice, but would any-
one seriously suggest that psychologists be criminally prosecuted for
judgments that may have been very misguided and, therefore, negli-
gent in a tort sense? By the same standard, bishops should not be
criminally responsible for relying on bad advice, upon which many,
myself included, think bishops should have known not to rely.
II. ALLEGED OMISSIONS AS THE BASIS FOR STATE
INTRUSION INTO CHURCH OPERATIONS
The child reporting statutes and the child endangerment statutes
raise issues with respect to the intrusion of state power into the juris-
diction of the Church. The New Hampshire Attorney General's Re-
port on the Investigation of the Diocese of Manchester briefly consid-
ered the First Amendment's religion clauses and too quickly
concluded that the relevant statutes met the test of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith. 75 The report correctly cited Smith for the proposition that
the Free Exercise Clause does not require the State to provide relig-
ions exemptions to laws of general application.'" The report, however,
failed to mention that the opinion also notes that a state can grant
certain religious exemptions if it so chooses." The report reflects no
awareness that reporting statutes threaten the priest-penitent privi-
lege, or that New Hampshire's child endangerment statute has an ex-
plicit religious exemption that may be applicable."
A. Reporting Statutes
The most likely criminal charge against dioceses or bishops
would be the failure to report evidence of child abuse. Most allega-
tions of sexual abuse of minors are for misconduct that occurred years
73 id. at 91-92.
74 See id.
76 N.H. Arr'y GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 19-20; see 494 U.S. 872,885 (1990).
76 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
77 See id. at 890.	
•
713 See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text for an analysis of the potential appli-
cation of this religions exemption.
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ago, however, and thus would be barred by the statute of limitations.
This legal barrier has not prevented New Hampshire prosecutors
from making use of child abuse reporting statutes in creatively cob-
bling together a case."
Reporting statutes vary in coverage.'" Some states impose the ob-
ligation to report on a limited list of professionals, namely physicians
and teachers. Others impose the obligation on every person with
knowledge. Those statutes pose policy and constitutional problems
quite apart from their application to the Church. Insofar as those
statutes apply to every person, they represent a notable exception for
criminal liability in the United States. Generally, failure to report a
crime—as distinct from concealing a crime—has been rejected as a
crime itself in this country. Whereas the common law may have pun-
ished misprision of a felony, namely the failure to report a felony, al-
most all American jurisdictions have rejected the common-law of-
fense.fll Federal law has an offense labeled misprision of a felony, but
it actually requires proof of concealment. 82 New Hampshire law does
not even punish concealment of a crime, except for its reporting stat-
ute.113
Reporting statutes have particular application to school teachers.
The ongoing relationship between teacher and student means that a
teacher may be more informed about family situations than many
persons. The accuracy of that proposition, however, varies widely.
Based on my own unscientific surveys, teachers greatly resent statutes
that require them to report evidence of child abuse. They find them-
selves in a dilemma due to terrible uncertainty about what circum-
stances trigger that obligation. To some people, any physical disci-
pline of a child represents child abuse. To others, physical discipline
for a child is essential and may be a matter of religious obligation. If a
teacher knows that a parent has spanked a child, does the teacher
have a duty to report? How much spanking is too much? Insofar as
such statutes impose an obligation on public school teachers, it can be
argued at least that the state is exercising its role as parens patriae.
Applied to non-public school teachers, however, such statutes may be
79 See N.H. A•i -r'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 12-13.
9° See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege
and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1138-39 (2003).
8' See LA FAYE, supra note 10, § 13.6(b).
82 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
83 See Warren C. Nighswander, Reporting Child Sexual Abuse Under the Child Protection Act:
An Unofficial Plinter for the General Practitioner, 36 N.H. BAR J.52, 52-53 (1995).
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interfering with the relationship freely chosen between parents and
teachers.
Little attention, meanwhile, has been given to the issue of sexual
abuse by public school teachers. According to a longtime national
wire service reporter, the members of the media have downplayed
public school teacher sexual abuse in comparison to the treatment
given to the Church, even though the same issues of breach of trust
are involved.84 Quite apart from whether the media is in fact operat-
ing according to a double standard, however, what about the respon-
sibility of principals, school administrators, and school districts in no-
torious cases of sexual abuse by public school teachers? Are any grand
jury investigations being targeted against the administrators involved?
Certainly, the theory of vicarious criminal liability can be applied
equally well (although wrongly) to public school officials.
The uncertainties of child abuse reporting statutes have gener-
ated challenges. that they are unconstitutionally vague. 88 Although
such challenges generally have not been successful, the reality re-
mains that imposing guilt by omission under a very broad duty, for
example, in New Hampshire "having reason to suspect," creates an
indeterminate obligation. 88 Moreover, in some states like New Hamp-
shire, the crime effectively has no mens rea requirement. 87 It imposes
84 James D. Clifford, It's Not Just Priests, AMERICA, Dec. 2, 2002, at 10.
05 See Sheriff, Washoe County v. Sferrazza, 766 P.2d 896, 897 (Nev, 1988) (holding
child abuse reporting statute unconstitutionally vague). But see People v. Cavaiani, 432
N.W.2d 409, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Minn. 1989);
State v. Hurd, 400 N.W2d 42, 45-46 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (all upholding child abuse re-
porting statutes against vagueness challenges).
86 See N.H. litv. S•AT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1996).
87 The New Hampshire child abuse reporting statute has a "knowingly" requirement,'
which would seem to require a mens rea. See id. A "knowingly" requirement attached to an
act, otherwise known as a general intent, simply requires that one act with the knowledge
that he or she is acting. The fact that one performs the act is a sufficient basis for inferring
that it was done "knowingly." Omissions are very different, however. People are continually
"not doing things," if only because they are doing other things. Whether "not doing some-
thing" constitutes an omission depends on whether one had a duty to act and also whether
one was aware of the duty to act. Without knowledge of the facts that give rise to the duty,
one's failure to act cannot be done "knowingly." Under the New Hampshire reporting
statute, however, "to act 'knowingly' in failing to make a report as required is simply to
have knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the obligation to report." Nighswander,
supra note 83, at 53 (emphases added). If one in good faith misjudges "the circumstances,"
that good-faith failure would not , seem to be defensible because "the duty to report is abso-
lute so long as there is a 'reason to suspect' that a particular child has been abused or ne-
glected." Id. (emphases added). Note that per the Attorney General's report, the bishops
in question did not necessarily have knowledge at relevant tunes about particular children.
See, for example, Dr. Edward Conners's 1976 letter to Bishop Gendron concerning Father
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de facto strict liability. 88
 The failure to require a mens rea, coupled
with ambiguous language, often renders a statute unconstitutionally
vague.89
 The New Hampshire Attorney General contends he can use
violations of this statute to establish the mens rea required by the
child endangerment statute. This illustrates how prosecutors often
confuse a lot of tort negligence with what is qualitatively different—a
criminal mental element or mens rea 9D
Broad child abuse reporting statutes, like New Hampshire's, po-
tentially impose liability on anyone who has any contact with minors.
Yet, in practice, these statutes are not applied against many people
who literally could be charged under the statute—not even those,
such as teachers, who have actual contact with the children at issue.
How, then, can these statutes be used against bishops who are far re-
moved from actual contact with the children? Applying these statutes
to teachers who observe physical signs of child abuse is problematic,
but the application of these statutes to bishops who lack the same
firsthand knowledge is groundless.
Application of these reporting statutes to bishops is likely to
conflict with the priest-penitent privileges.9' As happened in New
Hampshire, some priests will personally inform a bishop of their sex-
ual misconduct. In such a one-on-one situation, when a priest admits
his sin, one would hope that he would be making his confession with
a plea of forgiveness and promise to sin no more. Within the context
of the sacrament, the bishop-priest's first responsibility would be to
dispense absolution and an appropriate penance. The state cannot
prescribe the penance. Even when such conversations do not begin
under the seal of confession, they soon would likely come therein.
Aube's homosexual conduct with an eighteen year-old male, who does not fall within the
child reporting statute. N.H. Airev GEN. REP., Supra note 1, at 39-40. The report empha-
sizes statements in the letter generally about the need to keep Fr. Aube away from chil-
dren. Such a letter could not give rise to a reporting requirement. Incidents involving par-
ticular juveniles came to Bishop Gendron's attention in 1981. Id. at 47-54. The Attorney
General's office and the Diocese disagree as to the point (either 1976 or 1981) at which
the Diocese knew of its obligations. See id.
88 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29.
89 See, e.g., NAACP Anne Arundel County Branch v. City of Annapolis, 133 F. Supp. 2d
795, 807-12 (D. Md. 2001) (holding city's anti-loitering statute unconstitutionally vague
due to lack of mens rea element and narrow scope of people who fit under the statute who
would be prosecuted).
p° See HALL, supra note 47, at 116.
91 See generally J. Michael Keel, Comment, Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-
Penitent Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 Cum. L. REV. 681 (1997-98); see also N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1996) (privilege for communications made to religious leaders).
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Moreover, almost any conversation between a priest and his bishop
might be privileged in those states that have expanded the privilege
into a spiritual-counselor privilege. 92 For courts to question bishops
about the priest's confession, or to use the knowledge gained by the
bishop as a basis for claiming the bishop and the diocese have com-
Mined a crime, would violate the seal of confession and intrude on
the jurisdiction of the Church.
It is not difficult to imagine the ramifications of imposing such
statutes on bishops. If a state statute imposes a reporting obligation
on the bishop, does not the bishop become an agent of the state when
he questions the priest? How should the bishop clarify for himself and
the priest whether he is acting in his canonical or state-agent capacity?
Without pursuing law classroom-type hypotheticals, I mean this only
as an introduction to the larger issue of the civil versus ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, a topic discussed more fully in other Articles from this
Symposium. 93
B. The Child Endangerment Statutes Religious Exemption
The New Hampshire child endangerment statute contains a
specific religious exemption, which reads as follows: "A person who
pursuant to the tenets of a recognized religion fails to conform to an
otherwise existing duty of care or protection is not guilty of an offense
under this section."94 The provision clearly applies and was intended
to apply to Christian Scientists, in deference to their religious objec-
tion to medical treatment.95 In the opinion of the New Hampshire
prosecutors, the exemption has no application to the Diocese because
the Church does not endorse sexual abuse of children. 96 Of course
not! But that does not mean this statute is inapplicable. State prosecu-
tors cannot be expected to understand the obligations of bishops un-
der Church law, More to the point, their attempts to make secular
judgments about ecclesiastical matters unavoidably intrude into mat-
ters protected by the religion clauses of the Constitution, as discussed
92 Sec Abrams, supra note 80, at 1133.
95 Sce Rev. John J. Coughlin, The Clergy Sexual Abuse Crisis and the Spirit of Canon Law, 44
B.C. L. REV. 977, 982, 995-96 (2003); John Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the Liability of
Churches for Negligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1167, 1177-78
(2003).
94 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3, IV.
95 SCC JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
556-57 (2001).
" Telephone Interview, supra note 3.
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by Professor John Mansfield. 97
 State officials must respect the fact that
they lack the competence to interpret those ecclesiastical obligations.
Therefore, their attempts to draw inferences about whether a bishop
had a mens rea when he did or did not act are very likely to be erro-
neous.
As previously discussed, the New Hampshire prosecutors would
prove the mens rea "purposely" on the theory "that the Diocese con-
sciously choose [sic] to protect itself and its priests from scandal, law-
suits, and criminal charges instead of protecting the minor parishion-
ers."98 In doing so, they have adopted a certain social construction
about how Catholic bishops generally acted in response to the sexual
abuse by priests. As explained by Professor Jenkins in 1996, the cur-
rent view of the priest sexual abuse scandal became dominant around
1989, which was well after the events in question occurred in New
Hampshire.99
 The New Hampshire prosecutors apparently never con-
sidered the possibility that they were retroactively applying a view that
was not even held at the time of the events, Nor did they give any
weight to Church law, which imposes duties on bishops in their han-
dling of priests.
The New Hampshire legislature probably was not thinking about
the Church when it adopted the religious exemption to the child en-
dangerment statute. That, however, does not end the inquiry. What
matters is the meaning of the text. The fact is that the New Hamp-
shire prosecutors are imposing a duty retroactively as to how they
think the bishops should have acted. This statutory exemption, how-
ever, makes clear—in a way that statutes in some states do not—that
state law enforcement should not be in the business of second-
guessing whether the obligations imposed by a particular religion are
reasonable.
Last year when the bishops met in Dallas, some groups of Catho-
lics and the media were pushing for a "zero-tolerance" policy, which
ignored Church requirements for due process for priests. 150 Those
who are not Catholic, and even those who are, may not understand
that the Church has its own legal process, as provided in the 1983 Co-
dex Iuris Canonici—the Code of Canon Law. Within that process, the
97
 Mansfield, supra note 93, at 1178-79.
9a N.H. A•CY GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 8; see also supra notes 64-65 and accompany-
ing text.
SCejENKINS, supra note 70, at 3.
to See Mary McCrory, Editorial, The Bishops Come up Short, WASII. Yost, June 23,2002,
at 137.
2003]	 Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops	 1081
local ordinary has judicial powers, along with executive and legislative
powers. Unlike federal and state governments, these powers are not
separated into three branches of governance, but reside unitarily in
the local bishop. Decisions made by a local bishop regarding offend-
ing priests involve elements of ecclesiastical discipline and punish-
ment.
As with any judge, we may disagree with what we consider to be a
lenient punishment. But when a state judge imposes light punish-
ments that allow criminals back on the streets where they commit
other crimes, 'including murder or rape, no one seriously believes that
the judge can be criminally prosecuted—unless the judge took a bribe
to give a light sentence. Indeed, the judge has absolute immunity
even from a civil suit. 101 An outraged public can make its case in the
media, seek mandatory sentencing statutes, or attempt recall or im-
peachment—when those options are available. If the judge has done
something that is not a crime but violates judicial ethics, a complaint
may be filed before the appropriate body—but that body is a system
separate from the regular courts. So it should be with bishops. If there
is a case against one or more bishops for their failures in the sexual
abuse scandals, the proper jurisdiction is that of the Church. A
bishop's obligations under Church law are, and should be, more de-
manding than under state law. Charges against bishops can be
brought within the ecclesiastical courts. 1 °2
As reflected in the religious exemption in New Hampshire's child
endangerment statute, secular authorities should not make judgments
about the reasonableness of omissions that are intertwined with relig-
ious doctrine. Now, the New Hampshire Attorney General has pre-
scribed a stricter-than-the-statute reporting obligation for the Dio-
cese. 103 These new reporting requirements can be compared to and
contrasted with the new attorney reporting provisions of the Sarbaties-
Oxley Act. 104 For the first time, federal law has inserted itself into mat-
ters of lawyer conduct and ethics, which until now have been almost
entirely matters of state law. Pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has recently proposed regula-
tions governing when, what, and to whom outside legal counsel must
1 ° 1 See, e.g., Stump r. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978).
102 See 1983 ConE cc.1405, 1444.
1 °3 See N.1-1. ATCY GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 2.
1" See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
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"report evidence of a 'material violation." 05
 In the view of federal
prosecutors, however, a lawyer should be required to report "up-the-
ladder" immediately upon learning of material evidence.")° After exten-
sive comments, the SEC disagreed with this view and recognized that
there should be a reasonable investigation by the lawyer before advis-
ing the corporation about its obligation to' report. 10 This view repre-
sents a recognition that there are considerations of process within a
corporate culture that should be respected for good reasons, and that
prosecutors should not jump to the conclusion of criminal conduct
because outside counsel failed to act as quickly as a prosecutor thinks
in hindsight he or she should have acted. If, however, one were to ap-
ply the theory of the New Hampshire Attorney General to the recent
corporate scandals in the same retroactive fashion, federal prosecu-
tors should be able to indict any number of in-house attorneys and
outside counsel for their failures to report suspected corporate mis-
representations to the SEC.
C. State Oversight
As in federal criminal cases against corporations, the New Hamp-
shire prosecutors have extracted concessions from the Diocese that
involve oversight by the state. As taken from the Attorney General's
report, these requirements, inter alia, impose stricter reporting obli-
gations on the Diocese than the already strict law and give the Attor-
ney General ongoing oversight of Diocesan policies and protocols re-
garding priest and personnel training on child sexual abuse issues.i° 8
105
 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670, 71,674 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
1°6 See Howard Goldstein, They're Here! Sort of... 'Final' Sarbanes-Oxley Rules on Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Feb. 2003, at 1, 4.
107 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, supra note
105, at 71, 691-97.
1 °8 The N.H. ATir'v GEN. REP., supra note 1, at 2 provides:
Protection of Children: Under the agreement, the Diocese is required to
comply with mandatory reporting requirements for sexual abuse of minors (chil-
dren under the age of eighteen) that are even more stringent than under current
law. All Diocesan personnel will be required to acknowledge, in writing, their
knowledge and understanding of these reporting requirements. The Diocese
is obligated to train its personnel on issues of child sexual abuse. The Diocese
will establish a centralized office to handle allegations of sexual abuse of mi-
nors, to establish policies and protocols for handling such cases, and to main-
tain all records and information relating to such matters.
Accountability: The Diocese is obligated to submit to an annual audit by
the AGO, focusing on the manner in which the Diocese has responded to al-
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What the New Hampshire prosecutors are doing simulates the
federal trend of effectively imposing "codes of conduct" on corpora-
tions. When deciding whether to indict a corporation, the United
States Department of Justice has considered whether a corporation
has a code of conduct. 109 The federal Sentencing Guidelines consider
codes of conduct as a sentencing factor.no These codes give the fed-
eral government power over corporations it otherwise lacks. The fed-
eral government does not charter private corporations and, therefore,
does not generate authority over even public corporations. Recent
corporate scandals and prosecutions have served to extend federal
control through codes of conduct. The recently passed Sarbanes-
Oxley law makes "codes of conduct" virtually mandatory for public
corporations and asserts authority, for the first time, over attorney-
client relations to
The Church should recognize the New Hampshire settlement for
what it potentially is: "the camel's nose inside the tent." Over the
years, the U.S. Department of Justice has set precedents by bringing
and then settling dubious cases against corporations and other busi-
ness entities. Over time, prosecutors use these unlitigated "prece-
dents" to launch bolder prosecutions, as circumstances permit. This
intrusion by a state prosecutor into the jurisdiction of the Church may
encourage and be the basis for actions by other state prosecutors.
However well-intended, in order "to heal the wounds," the decision by
the Diocese to enter into this agreement represents a dangerous ca-
legations of sexual abuse of minors. It is also required to permit the AGO to
review and comment on policies, protocols, and training materials relating to
such matters. The agreement will be reviewed in five years upon a motion by
the State. In addition, all terms of the agreement are enforceable by the
Hillsborough County Superior Court.
Transparency: The agreement also provides for a complete disclosure of
the facts relating to the Diocese's past handling of sexual abuse allegations
against priests. This report details the facts discovered by the State during its
investigation of those cases that the Task Force investigated. In addition, the
State is releasing copies of documents obtained from the Diocese, as well as
investigative reports and other information gathered by the Task Force dur-
ing the course of this investigation.
Id. (emphasis added).
09 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to the
Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys § VII (Jan. 20, 2003), at
http://www.usdolgov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm.
110 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2002) (subtracts points for cor-
porations having an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law").
nt See 2 Tuomns LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.7, at 23 (4th ed.
Stipp. 2003).
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pitulation by one diocese that may have created a serious threat to the
other dioceses in the United States.
Some will object that bishops have a moral obligation to act with
regard to priests that justifies intrusion by the state. As a matter of
moral law and Church law, bishops certainly have a serious responsi-
bility. Indeed, Canon Law imposes on bishops the obligation to exer-
cise the Church's penal jurisdiction over priests who engage in certain
sexual misconduct. 112
 The fact that bishops may be culpable under
Church law for omissions with respect to the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion, 113
 however, does not mean that they are criminally culpable un-
der secular law, or that the state has any jurisdiction to determine
such matters.'" Moral culpability should be a necessary condition for
criminal liability, but it is not a sufficient condition for criminal liabil-
ity.
Bishops may be morally culpable under Church law even when
they are not criminally culpable under secular law. Under Canon Law,
persistent, public violations of the Sixth Commandment by priests
constitute penal offenses," 5
 but not so, under state criminal law. Al-
though media reports suggest that most of the sexual misconduct by
priests involves pedophilia, this is not true. The term "pedophilia"
applies to young children up to prepubescent youngsters." 6 The vast
majority of instances of priest sexual abuse involve teenage boys or
young men. 117
 Although indefensible, such conduct is not the same as
pedophilia. In other words, most of the sexual misconduct is homo-
sexual conduct. In most states, homosexual conduct itself has been
decriminalized. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, re-
cently declared unconstitutional those state statutes that criminalize
homosexual sodomy." 8 Even before Lawrence, for consensual homo-
sexual conduct to constitute a crime, most states required that the
younger man's age fall within the definition of the particular state
statute relating to sex with minors. So, even though a bishop does not
violate secular law for failure to discipline a priest's homosexual con-
" 2 1983 CODE c.1395.
"3 See id. cc.135, 391.
" 4 See Mansfield, supra note 93, at 1170.
"8 1983 Coot: c.1395, § 1.
118 JF.NKmrs, supra note 70, at 78.
" 7 See id. at 79-80.
"8 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483-84 (2003).
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duct, he could be culpable under Canon Law for failing to discipline
properly a priest who persists in homosexual conduct." 9
CONCLUSION
The attempts to indict bishops and dioceses based on the sexual
abuse crimes of priests amount to efforts to impose vicarious liability,
which is appropriate only in civil or administrative cases. Under-
standably, angry laypeople may not care to distinguish between civil
and criminal liability. Moreover, charitable immunity from civil liabil-
ity in Massachusetts simply increases the anger and prompts the desire
for punishment through the criminal justice system.'" Regardless of
the very serious criminal and moral wrongs perpetrated by some
priests, and the terrible spiritual, moral and psychological damage to
the victims, however, negligence in responding to these crimes does
not constitute criminal conduct by a bishop or diocese.
For a criminal case based on the failure to act by a bishop, the
facts would have to demonstrate that he acted in ways that reflected a
clear mens rea. Not even the New Hampshire prosecutors claim any
bishop specifically intended to assist a priest in sexually abusing any-
one. At most, what New Hampshire prosecutors claim they might
prove would amount to recklessness if the evidence established that a
bishop knew a particular priest posed a high risk of sexually assaulting
children and the bishop consciously chose to act or not act in a way
that he knew put children in immediate danger of sexual assault. Un-
der the facts, however, the conduct of the bishops does not appear to
involve that kind of conscious or deliberate disregard of danger to
particular persons. Arguments about what and when bishops knew or
should have known certain facts necessarily involve very debatable
inferences. But any argument that rests on the claim that bishops
"should have known" amounts to no more than negligence. Moreover,
in making judgments about whether bishops "consciously disre-
garded" their obligations, secular authorities are giving virtually no
weight to—and indeed are incapable of judging—the legitimate obli-
gations of the office of bishop under Church law.
119 See 1983 CODE cc.392, 1395. A violation of Canon Law "by omitting necessary dili-
gence," may not actually be subject to a canonical penalty. Moreover, only the Roman Pon-
tiff can judge bishops in penal cases. Id. c.1405, § 1.
120 See Catharine Pierce Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justice: Making Churches
Pay for the Sins of Their Clergy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1201, 1202, 1224-27 (2003).
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Bishops in the United States certainly need to rethink their han-
dling of their responsibilities. Perhaps they think of themselves more
as executives than as judges. Good executives delegate and tend to
judge only the results. A judge, on the other hand, rules on the valid-
ity of particular actions, not merely their consequences. It seems that
bishops have not reflected much on exercising their judicial authority.
Bishops may wish to consider taking steps to reinvigorate the penal
part of their jurisdic tion." 1
If bishops are simply secular CEOs, they, along with dioceses,
should expect to be treated like other CEOs and corporations, mean-
ing they can be indicted for crimes committed by their employees
even though they were not actually complicit in the crime. Hopefully,
prosecutors beyond New Hampshire will realize and respect that the
Church as a "corporation" does not owe its existence to the state, and
that state officers exceed their jurisdiction by judging Church proce-
dures and doctrines. If they appreciate the entanglement with Catho-
lic doctrine and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, they should have the good
sense not to indict. Any indictments of bishops or dioceses would con-
stitute an even greater intrusion into ecclesiastical jurisdiction. To
preserve that jurisdiction in practice, however, bishops must exercise
it. That involves local ordinaries acting in a clearly judicial capacity.
Few people realize that bishops are judges within the Church's juris-
diction. Moreover, for several decades bishops in the United States
seem to have de-emphasized the legal dimensions of the Church. 122
The public needs to witness bishops exercising their judicial jurisdic-
tion more vigorously.
If bishops had exercised their criminal jurisdiction over sexual
misconduct of priests, it would have gone a long way toward convinc-
ing others that they had not failed or omitted to perform their duty.
Some contend that bishops should automatically and simply turn
priests over to the state for prosecution. I would argue that the
Church has the right to insist on exercising its own penal jurisdiction.
That is not to claim that Church jurisdiction is exclusive. Rather, the
situation involves dual jurisdictions similar to that of two or more
secular jurisdictions that want to prosecute the same person. As with
the D.C.-area snipers, who are being prosecuted by several states and
the federal government, it is often necessary for the different jurisdic-
Iv See 1983 CODE c.1311-1363.
122 See generally Coughlin, supra note 93.
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Lions to work out some kind of accommodation as ID the order of
prosecution. 123
The initial reaction to this crisis by the bishops—meeting as a
group in Dallas—was a weak-kneed attempt to stem the torrent of
criticism. They should have known that it would be unacceptable in
Rome, because it failed to provide accused priests with adequate pro-
cedural protections. Within the Church itself, as bishops well know,
the force of popular opinion has only limited impact. Within the po-
litical arena, on the other hand, public opinion may be prompting or
pressuring elected prosecutors to launch criminal probes of bishops
and dioceses. Against what has become a lynch-mob mentality in some
areas of the country, the Church must defend its doctrine and juris-
diction against the intrusions of the state.
123 See Susan Schmidt & Katherine Shaver, Muhammad Interrogation in Dispute; U.S. At-
torneys Cut Off Talks, Local Prosecutor Alleges, WAsn. PosT , Oct. 31, 2002, at Al.
